Home 亚洲 Does China Really See America as Declining?——A Discussion with The New York Times
亚洲北美

Does China Really See America as Declining?——A Discussion with The New York Times

Share

Abstract: This article examines and challenges the implicit assumption in a recent The New York Times commentary that China has formed a unified perception of the United States as a declining power. It argues that Chinese views of America are far more diverse and internally contested than many external narratives suggest. While some Chinese scholars, commentators, and policy elites believe the United States is experiencing structural decline, others continue to view America as possessing enduring strengths in innovation, finance, institutional resilience, and global influence. The article further contends that both China and the United States are increasingly vulnerable to “cognitive simplification” — the tendency to reduce complex societies into singular strategic identities. It concludes that such simplification may itself become a strategic risk in contemporary international relations, narrowing the space for mutual understanding and increasing the potential for miscalculation.

Key Words: American Decline Debate, Cognitive Simplification, international communication, Strategic Perception, US-China Relations

By BI Yantao

May 12, 2026

Recently, The New York Times published an opinion article titled Trump Is Coming to a China That Has Moved On, which implicitly advances an important proposition: that China increasingly views the United States as a “declining power.”

This observation is not entirely unfounded.

Over the past decade, narratives about “American decline” have become increasingly common in Chinese online discourse, parts of academia, and strategic studies circles. Especially after the global financial crisis, the withdrawal from Afghanistan, rising political polarization, mounting debt, and the “Trump phenomenon,” arguments about a “crisis of the American system” have gained broader traction in China. The phrase “the East is rising while the West is declining” has become one of the most recognizable expressions of this sentiment. Yet such views do not mean that China has reached a unified internal consensus about America’s future.

To conclude from this, however, that “China has formed a unified perception of American decline” risks oversimplifying the country’s far more complex and internally diverse cognitive landscape. The issue is not merely whether the United States is declining, but who gets to define how “China” sees America.

“China Thinks” Is Not a Simple Proposition

When discussing China, Western media often unconsciously employ what might be called a “single-subject narrative”, such as “China believes,” “Beijing thinks,” “China sees the United States as,” “China is preparing for”.

Such formulations are common in journalism, but they often obscure an important reality: China is not a cognitively homogeneous community. Particularly regarding perceptions of the United States, substantial differences have long existed within China.

One school of thought argues that the United States is entering a phase of structural decline.

Those who hold this view typically emphasize intensifying political polarization, growing social fragmentation, deindustrialization, unsustainable fiscal deficits and debt, declining global governance capacity, the rising costs of alliance maintenance, challenges to dollar hegemony, and the weakening appeal of liberal Western narratives.

In their view, America’s problem is not imminent collapse, but the increasing cost of sustaining global hegemony. This assessment aligns in many ways with the logic of “hegemonic decline” in international relations theory.

China Also Has a Strong “America Remains Powerful” Camp

At the same time, another markedly different perspective has long existed within China.

A number of strategic analysts, business leaders, and intellectuals do not accept the conclusion that the United States is undergoing irreversible decline.

They argue that despite America’s serious internal problems, its deep structural advantages remain extraordinarily strong, including the world’s leading innovation ecosystem, elite universities and research networks, dominance of the dollar and global financial system, a powerful alliance structure, the ability to attract top global talent, advantages in AI, semiconductors, biotechnology, and other frontier sectors, and strong institutional self-correction mechanisms.

From this perspective, the United States is experiencing a cyclical adjustment rather than a civilizational decline.

This group is particularly wary of one strategic danger: mistaking America’s temporary disorder for irreversible long-term decline.

Historically, the United States has repeatedly been predicted to decline — during the rise of Japan in the 1970s, after the Vietnam War, and following the 2008 financial crisis. Yet each time, the United States demonstrated a significant capacity for reorganization and adaptation.

For these observers in China, the most important thing about America is not its problems, but its resilience.

China and the United States Are Both Misreading Each Other

What deserves greater attention is that China has not formed a unified “American decline consensus,” just as the United States has not formed a unified “China rise consensus.”

In recent years, the American strategic community has also displayed deep divisions:

some believe China is steadily rising; others argue that China has already peaked; some foresee long-term economic stagnation in China; others still view China as possessing enduring systemic competitiveness.

In other words, both China and the United States are attempting to interpret each other while failing to reach stable internal consensus themselves.

This suggests that one of the greatest risks today may not be confrontation itself, but cognitive simplification — and the media play a major role in this process.

When a complex, multilayered China with substantial internal disagreements is compressed into a singular strategic actor, the outside world is more likely to develop the illusion that “China unanimously believes America is declining.”

Reality is far more complicated.

The “American Decline” Narrative May Itself Become a Strategic Risk

Historically, one of the most dangerous moments in international politics occurs when one major power believes another is declining while that power still retains enormous capabilities.

A “declining power” is not necessarily a safer power. In some cases, it may become more sensitive, more reactive, and more determined to defend the existing order. Similar cognitive structures appeared historically between Germany and Britain, and between Japan and the United States.

This is partly why the phrase “declining but dangerous” has become increasingly common in American strategic discourse.

In fact, many within China’s strategic community hold a similar view. They argue that the real question is not whether America is declining, but whether it is willing to accept relative decline.

Therefore, the most important issue today may not be whether America is declining, but whether China and the United States are developing increasingly rigid and deterministic perceptions of each other.

Once such judgments become ideological, emotionalized, and heavily mediated, the space for genuine mutual understanding may continue to shrink.

Cognitive Complexity Matters More Than Emotional Judgment

The New York Times article captures certain real emotional and cognitive shifts within Chinese society. But its problem lies in the impression it may leave on outside audiences: that China has already formed a unified, stable, and definitive consensus regarding American decline.

In reality, Chinese perceptions of the United States are far more diverse than many outsiders assume.

Some believe America is declining. Some believe it remains the world’s strongest country. Others believe America is both declining and still dangerous. These differences themselves demonstrate that China is not a single-track cognitive community.

In international communication, an increasingly important question is this: Are we trying to understand the real “other,” or are we continuously constructing a simplified image of the other? 

That question may ultimately matter more than whether America is declining.

BI Yantao is Professor at the School of International Communication and Arts, Hainan University, China and Senior Research Fellow at the Charhar Institute. The views expressed here are solely those of the author and do not represent the positions of affiliated institutions.

Related Articles

台湾观察:民进党的选举逻辑与台湾的长远利益

一个政党的政治主张是否真正有利于台湾,最终要看它能否转化为持久的安全、发展与社会福祉。 作者:毕研韬 |  发布时间:2026年11月21日 近几年台湾选举呈现一个值得关注的现象:民进党在总统选举中的表现相对稳定,但其政治主张并没有在所有选举中获得同等程度的支持。2024年,赖清德赢得总统选举,得票率为40.05%;与此同时,民进党在立法机构选举中只获得51席,少于国民党的52席。2025年,针对31名国民党立法机构成员的罢免案又全部未获通过。 这些结果说明,民进党的选举策略具有一定的动员能力,但其政治主张并未形成台湾社会的广泛共识。 一个更值得思考的问题是:民进党赖以争取选举支持的政治逻辑,是否也有利于台湾的长远发展? 评价这个问题,需要将选举利益与社会利益区分开来,将短期政治收益与长期战略成本区分开来。 一、台湾主体性:政治自主与身份对立并非一回事 民进党长期强调台湾主体性,这一政治主张有其社会基础。经过长期民主化,台湾形成了自己的政治制度、社会组织和公共生活,台湾居民对自身政治前途的关注也具有现实合理性。维护民主制度、保障社会自主决定政治未来的权利,是台湾长期发展需要考虑的重要因素。 但需要区分两个不同层面:一个是维护台湾社会的政治自主性,另一个是通过强化与大陆的身份区隔来建构政治认同。两者并不必然一致。 政治主体性可以建立在民主制度、社会参与和公共治理的基础上,不必以持续强化两岸敌对意识为前提。如果政治认同越来越依赖外部对立,社会就可能陷入一种困境:政治上的团结需要不断寻找新的对立对象,正常的两岸交流也容易被赋予政治忠诚的含义。...

法国电视嘉宾:海外华人都可能是中国间谍

当国家安全怀疑越过证据边界、将族裔背景等同于政治忠诚时,受损的不只是海外华人的尊严,还有现代公民社会的基本原则。 作者:毕研韬 | 发布时间:2026年10月21日 2026年11月13日,法国公共广播机构Franceinfo电视节目《Les Informés》(知情者)围绕英伟达创始人黄仁勋事件展开讨论。节目接近尾声时,主持人问:“我们知道法国有多少中国间谍吗?” 法国国际关系与战略研究所(IRIS)研究主任Marie-Cécile Naves回答:“整个海外华人群体,都有可能。” 前情报人员、作家Vincent Crouzet接着说:“有这种可能。每一个中国公民或者来自中国的人,都仍然与党保持联系,并定期向党汇报情况。” 这些言论究竟反映了什么? 一、从安全怀疑到群体怀疑...

中美俄元首峰会与雅尔塔2.0:一场国际叙事博弈

泽连斯基借“雅尔塔2.0”唤起历史记忆,试图将大国外交转化为国际秩序与国家主权之争,在争夺峰会解释权的同时,抬高绕过乌克兰进行大国交易的政治成本。 作者:毕研韬 | 发布时间:2026年11月17日 11月19日,中俄美三国元首将在深圳举行历史上首次面对面会晤。峰会尚未召开,乌克兰总统泽连斯基已经发出警告,希望这次会晤不要演变成“雅尔塔2.0、3.0、4.0”,导致全球势力范围重新划分。 将三国元首深圳峰会与1945年的雅尔塔会议联系起来,究竟是合理的历史类比,还是一种具有特定政治目的的叙事策略?这不仅涉及对国际秩序演变的理解,也涉及国际传播中的议题设置、框架竞争和战略叙事。 一、雅尔塔会议与深圳峰会:两个不同的时代 1945年2月,美、英、苏三国领导人在克里米亚雅尔塔举行会议。当时第二次世界大战已经进入尾声,德国战败已成定局,欧洲传统大国实力严重衰退,国际权力结构正在发生重大变化。三国讨论的不仅是如何结束战争,还包括战后欧洲政治安排、德国处置、联合国建立以及大国势力范围等问题。 雅尔塔会议的历史意义,在于它参与塑造了第二次世界大战后的国际秩序。 今天的国际环境则完全不同。 首先,国际秩序并未因严重冲突而崩溃。当今世界虽然面临严重的地缘政治冲突和大国竞争,但联合国及其制度体系仍在运行,国际秩序更多表现为调整、竞争和局部重组,而非战后意义上的全面重建。 其次,国际权力结构更加多元。除中美俄之外,欧盟、印度及其他新兴经济体都具有重要影响力。三国之间的协调不可能自动转化为对整个国际社会的安排。...

黄仁勋事件背后的情报政治

当情报怀疑经过权威媒体层层传播,最终被当成事实,信息瀑布便可能成为一种不容忽视的政治权力。 作者:毕研韬 | 发布时间:2026年11月14日 英伟达创始人黄仁勋卷入婚外情和间谍疑云,最终辞去公司CEO职务。这起事件看似是个人丑闻,却迅速演变成涉及美国情报机构、主流媒体、中美科技竞争和美国国内政治的公共事件。值得关注的是:一个尚未得到充分证实的情报判断,如何演变成影响个人前途、企业经营乃至政治关系的重大事件。 一、情报怀疑如何成为公共议题? 2026年11月6日,《金融时报》报道黄仁勋与中国商人黄乐存在亲密关系。11月8日,黄仁勋承认对妻子不忠。11月10日,《纽约时报》披露,美国情报机构怀疑黄乐受中国国家安全部招募,可能通过与黄仁勋的关系获取信息。报道还称,美国国务卿鲁比奥曾向特朗普通报有关情报。 这条新闻迅速引发关注。然而,随后出现的信息却使最初的指控受到质疑。 11月12日,美国司法部长托德·布兰奇公开表示,司法部尚未对黄乐是否为中国间谍作出结论。他特别强调,自己从未说过黄乐是间谍。CNN同日援引知情人士报道,美国情报系统内部对相关证据存在分歧,一些官员认为现有材料不足以证明黄乐受中国政府指使从事间谍活动。 新加坡方面也表示,对黄乐及相关企业的调查涉及服务器采购和出口申报等问题,并非间谍调查。新加坡当局没有认定她从事间谍活动。 这些信息说明,不能因为黄仁勋承认婚外情,就把针对黄乐的间谍指控也当成事实。 二、警惕“信息瀑布”效应...