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CCP and Govt Should Exercise Caution in Joint Institutions with Universities

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Overall, the disadvantages of party and government agencies co-establishing research institutions with universities outweigh the benefits.

By Bi Yantao | August 21, 2026

In recent years, party and government agencies have increasingly established joint institutions with universities. Government agencies seek to draw on universities’ professional expertise to enhance governance capacity, while universities hope to leverage such cooperation to translate research findings and expand their development opportunities. This type of cooperation has its merits, but three questions must be answered: Is such an institution genuinely necessary? Can the same objectives be achieved without establishing one? And what additional capacity would the institution actually bring to the government agency?

I. University Resources Do Not Necessarily Equal Professional Expertise

Today, there are significant differences in professional expertise not only among universities, but also among schools, research teams, and individual scholars within the same university. This is particularly true in emerging fields, interdisciplinary areas, and policy-related disciplines, where researchers who combine professional expertise, awareness of real-world issues, and practical analytical capabilities are relatively scarce.

Therefore, one should not assume that partnering with a university automatically provides access to the necessary professional expertise; that identifying a school or department head means finding the leading expert in the field; or that establishing a research institute automatically creates professional support capacity.

Particular caution is needed when administrative positions within universities are conflated with professional expertise. University leadership positions and academic expertise are governed by different systems of evaluation. Holding an administrative position does not necessarily mean that an individual is the most suitable professional leader in a particular field.

II. The Greatest Risk Is Replacing “Professional Selection” with “Administrative Selection”

A co-established institution first needs a person to lead it. In practice, the choice often begins with the existing administrative hierarchy of the university, first considering university leaders and then deans. Although this facilitates administrative coordination, it may create a fundamental mismatch.

The most professionally capable scholars at a university may not hold administrative positions. Researchers who have spent years studying a particular issue, understand real-world governance challenges, and are capable of building and leading research teams may not be deans. Even a university’s strongest expert in a given field may not belong to the school or department responsible for the joint institution.

The result may be that the institution is established and funding secured, while the strongest professional talent is not placed at its core—and may even be excluded altogether.

III. The Costs of Co-Establishing Institutions Go Beyond Financial Expenditure

Once a research institute or research center is established, it requires sustained investment. If it produces high-quality policy research and decision-making support, such investment is justified. But if the institution is primarily driven by an administrative leader while strong professional expertise is marginalized, public resources may be used inefficiently or even ineffectively.

The ultimate purpose of cooperation between government agencies and universities is to enhance policy research, decision-making support, and public governance. What is needed is professional expertise and research teams capable of addressing real-world problems—not institutional shells or prestigious titles.

Moreover, for university administrators, a jointly established institution may also bring additional project resources, social connections, and external cooperation opportunities. As a result, such institutions can potentially evolve from professional platforms into vehicles for resource expansion and vested interests. This does not mean that all university administrators have such motivations, nor that all joint institutions suffer from these problems. But because such an objective incentive structure exists, public authorities should not ignore it.

IV. In Emerging Fields, Find the “Captain” First, Then Consider Establishing an Institution

When government agencies enter a new field, their real need is to address gaps in professional expertise. The proper approach is therefore to first identify genuinely capable professional leaders: Who has worked on the issue over the long term? Who continuously tracks relevant developments? Who truly understands the practical governance challenges? Who can build a high-quality research team? And who can translate academic insights into actionable policy recommendations?

In practice, however, the opposite sequence can easily occur: first approach a university, then establish an institution, appoint a leader, and only afterward assemble the necessary research team. If a suitable professional leader has not been identified before the institution is established, inadequate professional capacity may be built into the institution from the outset.

This is particularly important in areas of public governance. Once professional assessments go wrong, the consequences may extend beyond a failed research project to policy orientation, the allocation of public resources, and even regional development.

A practical principle should therefore be established: If a genuinely suitable professional leader cannot be identified, a government agency should not rush to establish a joint institution.

V. Co-Establishing an Institution Is Not the Highest Form of University-Government Cooperation

Cooperation between government agencies and universities is necessary, but the forms of cooperation can be much more flexible. Commissioned research projects, special investigations, expert consultants, expert committees, project-based cooperation, and temporary or stage-based collaboration can all effectively connect professional expertise with governance needs.

Government agencies can identify practical problems and governance needs, invite multiple universities and research teams to propose solutions, and determine subsequent cooperation on the basis of professional competence, the quality of proposals, and actual performance.

This approach is more conducive to genuine professional competition than the model of “selecting a specific university → establishing a joint institution → appointing an administrative leader → assembling research resources afterward.” It can also reduce the excessive influence of university administrative structures over the allocation of professional expertise.

Ultimately, government agencies need stronger governance capacity, not another institutional plaque; they need professional leaders, not administrative chiefs; and their goal should be to get things done well, not to make institutions bigger.

Bi Yantao is a professor of communication studies, specializing in international communication, international conflict and peace. This article represents the author’s personal views and does not represent the position of his institution.

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